As the US froze foreign aid, and Britain cut it back drastically to increase defence spending, we were on the receiving end of our own warning. Elbridge Colby, Trump’s choice for head of policy at the US Defence Department, reminded Australia that it “faces a … powerful challenge in China”, and suggested it add tens of billions of dollars to defence in its budget.
No one in Canberra will need reminding that Colby is an AUKUS sceptic who questions the wisdom of selling nuclear submarines to Australia. The question now is how diplomacy and even allegiances with such a nakedly transactional and unconventional administration are best pursued. If Ukraine can be cut off from intelligence sharing in the middle of an existential conflict, what does that mean for the Five Eyes arrangements in the event of a sharp disagreement with US policy?
Loading
As chief political correspondent David Crowe reported, some senior figures in the defence debate feel it is time to step away altogether. Former ADF chief Chris Barrie told the ABC that “we need to be recalibrating our defence posture … to take account of a much more independent Australia from American leadership”, while Rear Admiral Peter Briggs even suggested ditching AUKUS and going back to the French for nuclear-powered submarines.
Whatever course the next Australian government opts for, it is clear that an end to the Russia-Ukraine war on the terms so far proposed by Trump, Vance and US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth would give Putin a victory and change the calculus in conflicts around the world.
Former Ukrainian defence minister Andriy Zagorodnyuk recently argued that a capitulation by Kyiv on those terms would “validat[e] aggression as a legitimate strategy”. There are parts of the world where that had never ceased to be the rule, but what is new is that this uncertainty now applies to nations in Washington’s fold, Australia included.
Loading
If Putin were to attempt to prise territory from a NATO member state in Europe following a settlement with Ukraine, could that state safely presume article 5, which ties alliance members to each other’s defence, still binds the Pentagon? In his February 12 speech in Brussels, Hegseth told NATO states contemplating a peacekeeping presence in Ukraine that article 5 wouldn’t cover them.
True to his America First principles, Trump sees the conflict primarily as an impost on the American purse, and ending it as a good deal for the US. That may indeed be the case in the short term. But long term, as Zelensky suggested to his detriment, it may have consequences that this administration does not anticipate.
As we hurtle towards a federal election in which the question of who can best manage the US relationship assumes increasing significance, it becomes more important than ever that our leaders can strike a balance between short-term costs and long-term values. Unless, that is, we are content to have our fate dictated by others.
