It’s now a Doorand line: Afghan Taliban using TTP to further its interest of not accepting British-era border with Pakistan
The present Taliban leadership in Afghanistan, with whom the army is now almost at war, is the same that was hosted and supported by it for decades, even at the cost of annoying the United States. Its failure to make the ‘friendly’ Taliban regime agree to address its concerns on Baloch separatism and TTP violence frustrates the army no bounds.
Most importantly, despite ‘friendly’ Taliban taking over in Afghanistan, till date Pakistan could not produce even a shred of evidence of Indian support to these groups, which it always alleged when Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani were ruling Afghanistan. That was an easy way to mislead the country and the world.
What the army doesn’t openly acknowledge is the fact that TTP came into existence soon after the military operation in Red Mosque in Islamabad, ordered by former president Parvez Musharraf, in 2007. At that time, the Afghan Taliban were nowhere near getting power. But that would clearly make out that TTP was a domestic violent religious extremist group and not a proxy of the Afghan Taliban that the army is now trying to make out.
Like other terror groups, Pakistan army didn’t have much of an issue so long as TTP fighters were supporting the Afghan Taliban against the Americans. In fact, for the army, its dream of having a ‘client’ regime in Afghanistan that it could leverage for Pakistan’s economic and strategic interests in the region by elbowing out India was to finally become a reality.But what happened on the ground after the American withdrawal was just the opposite. The Afghan Taliban regime is not only refusing to cooperate with Pakistan on this issue, it is perhaps trying to use TTP to further its strategic interest of not acknowledging the Durand line, a border drawn by the Britishers in 1893 and modified in 1919, that Pakistan inherited in 1947. That would explain the two main demands of TTP that it had placed before Pakistani authorities during talks. The first demand was for reversing the merger of the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that was carried out in 2018. And the second one was for establishing shariah in those areas. That would effectively mean passing the control of these areas to TTP and providing easy access for Afghan Taliban. That would automatically dilute the sanctity of Durand line.
Notonly that, TTP is also selectively targeting Pakistani security forces in the southern border districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to create a liberated zone for its cadres for rest and recuperation. But what makes the attacks by TTP deadly is the weaponry that they are using, including M4 rifles, that the Americans left in abundance before hastily departing.
The violence by the Baloch separatists and TTP has also angered China, as its nationals working in Pakistan are increasingly coming under attacks. That is why both China and Russia, in the meeting of the UN Sanctions Committee on December 12, called upon the Taliban regime to intensify their counter-terrorism effort. Russia has also not forgotten the ISKP attack in a Moscow theatre in March 2024.
Domestically, Pakistan army is facing its worst image crisis since 1971. Its narrative is being questioned and lampooned by a counternarrative being created on social media by handles linked to Imran Khan’s party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI).
Unlike all other creations, Imran Khan is turning out to be a huge “monster” for Pakistan army. While being lodged in Adiala jail in Rawalpindi, he has been successful in creating a narrative that provokes antiarmy sentiments across the country. The army expects Shehbaz Sharif government to politically counter the same. But a government that lacks political legitimacy cannot have the will and moral high ground to confront the agitating masses.
The root cause of the problem is that the army is unable to confront its past misdeeds of promoting religious extremism domestically at the cost of democracy and creating monstrous proxies to launch violent ‘jihad’ in the neighbourhood as an instrument of foreign policy. A game now being played back by the Afghan Taliban against its benefactors.
The Taliban may not have the capability to retaliate conventionally to Pakistan’s “punitive” attacks. However, its capacity to cause casualties to Pakistan security apparatus through its proxies remain intact despite bombings. Being the real power in Pakistan, even if from behind, the army can only blame itself for the ever-growing loss of its personnel at the hands of TTP and deteriorating relations with Afghanistan with no thaw in sight.
