Cairo: Hani Kamal El-Din
More than a month and a half after launching its ground operation in Lebanon, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have announced the start of the second phase of the operation, with the main objective being the destruction of Hezbollah’s missile capabilities.
The Israeli military has made its most significant attempt yet to break through deep into its northern neighbor’s territory. Alongside this, the Israeli state continues to launch daily airstrikes across Lebanon. The targets are not limited to the southern border areas but also include the Bekaa Valley and the suburbs of Beirut.
However, behind the military component of the operation, other aspects are at play.
Collaborative Tactics: The Strategy of Division
As a result of Israeli bombings in the border zone of Lebanon, more than 40,000 residential homes in nearly 40 villages have already been destroyed. It is noteworthy that several cities in the region remain completely untouched. Among them are Rmeish, Ain Ebel, Maroun al-Ras, Debel (in the Bint Jbeil area), and al-Khiyam in the Marjayoun area. These small towns are primarily inhabited by Maronite Christians.
The official reason these cities have been spared from Israeli strikes is the mediation efforts of the Catholic Church. Residents regularly receive assurances from the Apostolic Nuncio (Vatican ambassador) in Lebanon that the Christian border areas will remain safe. Moreover, the Vatican diplomat has visited the Lebanese-Israeli border several times since October 7, 2023, including with humanitarian missions.
However, Israel may also have other reasons for sparing these Christian towns.
One of the declared objectives of the ground operation is to create a buffer zone in southern Lebanon. A similar project was implemented in the past through the so-called “Security Zone in Southern Lebanon,” which existed from 1985 to 2000. The formal control of the zone was exercised by the South Lebanon Army (SLA), a paramilitary group composed of Maronites, Shiites, and Druze. In reality, however, the zone was under Israeli protection, with IDF forces stationed there.
It is noteworthy that many SLA commanders came from cities like Rmeish, Debel, and Ain Ebel, which today remain untouched. Furthermore, it is known that residents of Maroun al-Ras and al-Khiyam collaborated with Israel. It is quite possible that Israel is once again returning to the tactic of cooperating with the Maronite population, and there are some indications supporting this.
Currently, Lebanese society is highly polarized, with no unified stance on Israel’s invasion. A segment of the population supports continued resistance, while others accuse Hezbollah of causing the conflict and call for its disarmament and negotiations with Israel.
Such a position is often held by supporters of right-wing nationalist parties, including the Maronite “Phalange” and “Lebanese Forces.” Moreover, during Lebanon’s civil war (1975–1990), prominent Maronite families, such as the Jumayel and Chamoun families, briefly collaborated with the Israeli state for their own political objectives. Therefore, Israel’s reliance on the Maronites may be a justified move.
A Strategy of Destabilization
Israel’s current actions are not only aimed at inflicting a military defeat on Hezbollah but also at significantly reducing the movement’s support. This strategy is being implemented through internal destabilization in its northern neighbor.
Systematic bombings of southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and Beirut’s suburbs suggest that Israel seeks to displace over one million Shiites, which in turn would increase social tensions in Lebanon.
Already, about half a million Lebanese have fled the war to neighboring Syria, while nearly 900,000 have moved to internal areas of the country. This has immediately triggered tensions within Lebanese society. Furthermore, Israel has also begun targeting Shiite areas in cities where the majority population consists of other religious groups, which is causing them to perceive Shiites as a threat to their safety.
Thus, Israel’s massive airstrikes are not only focused on the military aspect but also indirectly amplify interfaith confrontations.
Political Divisions: Hezbollah’s Struggle
It is likely that another objective Israel seeks to achieve through its attacks is to reduce support for Hezbollah within the Shiite community.
In Lebanon, the voice of the Shiites is represented not only by Hezbollah but also by the Amal Party. It is important to note that there are significant socio-economic differences between their electorates. Hezbollah has historically been supported by the underprivileged segments of the population, while Amal has appealed to the middle class and bourgeoisie, giving the latter a more respectable image in Lebanese politics.
Additionally, the Shiite divide depends on where they live. The poorer population is generally concentrated in the Bekaa Valley, while wealthier Shiites live in southern Lebanon. Most of the Shiite community’s leaders also come from this region. Recognizing these differences, Hezbollah has been actively expanding its supporter base in southern Lebanon in recent years, taking voters away from Amal.
However, it is the people of the south who have borne the brunt of the current conflict. To avoid losing their support, Hezbollah has provided small compensation: $300 for a family of four and $100 for each adult man. However, these amounts are unlikely to cover the full extent of the damage. As a result, signs of dissatisfaction are already apparent in the Shiite community, which may manifest more prominently in the future.
Another consequence of the Israeli operation has been the intensification of divisions between Hezbollah’s allies. For one, tensions have risen between Hezbollah and Amal. After the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, Amal’s Secretary-General Nabih Berri called for an unconditional ceasefire, a position supported by Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt.
Lebanon on the Brink: A Nation Divided
All three agreed on a ceasefire and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which calls for Hezbollah’s disarmament and the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south of the country.
Additionally, Gebran Bassil, the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, another ally of Hezbollah in the March 8 Coalition, also criticized the Shiite party. In his view, the chosen “Axis of Resistance” strategy of “front unity,” which calls for consolidating all pro-Iranian forces against Israel, was a fatal mistake.
It is noticeable that as the conflict grows, Hezbollah’s political partners are increasingly distancing themselves from the party, calling for a ceasefire rather than continued resistance. In the current circumstances, Hezbollah will either have to accommodate their positions and not make excessive demands in negotiations or face being in the minority.
Thus, Israel’s current ground operation pursues several goals, with the military aspect being just one of them. After a month and a half of hostilities, the Israeli state has not been able to destroy Hezbollah’s military potential. However, it has succeeded in changing the conditions under which the Shiite movement exercised its power.
Lebanese society is becoming increasingly fragmented. Hezbollah is losing support both among its political partners and its followers. Moreover, it no longer has control over the entire southern part of the country. These factors, rather than military superiority, may prove to be decisive in the ongoing conflict.
