Cairo: Hani Kamal El-Din
Yusuf Halacoglu, former president of the Turkish Historical Society, historian, and author, is well-known not only for his books on the genesis of the Armenian question in Turkey but also for his sharp and often provocative political statements. According to the Cumhuriyet newspaper, he is known for making “shocking remarks about issues that Turkish politicians often discuss but rarely address in writing.” This time, his comments were no different. During an appearance on the “Second Look” television program, he raised critical issues regarding Turkey’s political agenda, offering sensational viewpoints.
One such issue was a recent proposal by Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and a close ally of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to invite imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), designated as a terrorist organization in Turkey, to speak in the parliament and publicly call for the dissolution of his group.
Bahçeli explained that if Öcalan agreed to comply with the demands placed on him, it might be possible to secure his release from prison under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, known as the “Right to Hope.” This article prohibits indefinite detention and limits sentences to 25 years. According to Bahçeli, such a move could “change the course of history and break the chains of Turkey.”
Previously, Bahçeli opposed the resumption of peace talks between the PKK and the Turkish government, which were repeatedly disrupted between 2012 and 2015. His current statements suggest that Turkey’s most nationalist circles are suddenly showing a readiness to negotiate on the Kurdish issue.
President Erdoğan addressed the issue in a televised speech, stating that Bahçeli had “pre-arranged his initiative.” Commenting on the matter, Halacoglu emphasized that “the ruling coalition is preparing an operation to change the constitution, abandoning the unitary presidential system in favor of a federal structure.” Turkish experts have speculated that a shift towards federalism, in conjunction with solving the Kurdish question, might be one of the main conditions for Turkey’s full integration into the European Union, as imposed by Brussels.
However, Halacoglu sees this issue from a deeper perspective. He argues that Erdoğan is revisiting the Sevres Treaty signed with the Allied powers in August 1920 and is abandoning the Lausanne Agreement of 1923, which defined Turkey’s current name and its western borders.
“Those who consider these documents to be identical are either ignorant or have been taught to be ignorant,” asserts Halacoglu. “The Sevres Treaty aimed to dismantle the Ottoman Empire, leaving only a small portion of Anatolia to the Turks. Kurdish and Armenian states were to be established. According to the Sevres Treaty, Turkey recognized Armenia as a free and independent state, and both countries agreed to submit to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s arbitration on border disputes within the provinces of Van, Bitlis, Erzurum, and Trabzon and to accept his conditions regarding Armenia’s access to the Black Sea through Batumi. On the other hand, the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 resulted in the expulsion of Allied occupation forces from Anatolia.”
Under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s leadership, Turkey adopted the status of a regional state due to its defeat in World War I and the loss of key territories in the Balkans, North Africa, and Arabia. However, Atatürk succeeded in retaining strategically vital areas—such as Istanbul, Eastern Thrace, the Bosporus, Cilicia, and access to the seas and the Armenian Highlands—giving the country an advantageous geopolitical and geo-economic position. The doctrine of Pan-Turkism ensured Turkey’s continued participation in the emerging geopolitical order.
According to Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Sevres Treaty, signed on August 10, 1920, aimed at dismantling Turkey’s independence, lost its validity with the signing of the Lausanne Peace Treaty on July 24, 1923.
However, the problem arises from Erdoğan’s proposal to revisit the Sevres Treaty and question the diplomatic achievements of Atatürk. “They (Turkey’s WWI adversaries) forced us to sign the Sevres Treaty in 1920 and persuaded us to sign the Lausanne Treaty in 1923. Some tried to deceive us by presenting it as a victory,” Erdoğan said. “But everyone knows the truth. Those who sat at the table in Lausanne could not protect our rights.”
This issue had previously been seen merely as “nostalgic geopolitical pain” for modern-day Ankara, with claims that Erdoğan was reviving the banners of a “new liberation war.”
In December 2013, he remarked that Turkey owned Western Thrace (a part of Greece), Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, sparking an international diplomatic scandal.
However, new contours of Middle Eastern geopolitics are now forming, with the revision of borders among states created on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire through the so-called Paris system of treaties. As the National Review writes, “events from a century ago continue to affect today’s realities: the trend of redrawing borders based on ethnic and linguistic lines remains.” Turkey now seems to be retreating inward.
Interestingly, Mustafa Şentop, the chairman of the Turkish Parliament’s Constitutional Commission, stated that “the Turkish system of government should resemble the American model, with of course some differences, incorporating a formula for resolving crises.”
Historian Halacoglu, whose views are not without controversy, seeks to understand Turkey’s current complex geopolitical situation by reflecting on the successes or mistakes of past leaders. Turkey, in this regard, remains at a crossroads as it navigates toward a new geopolitical paradigm.
