Cairo: Hani Kamal El-Din
The war between Israel and Gaza has now lasted for about a year. It began on October 7, 2023, with a daring operation by the Islamic resistance movement, Hamas, inside the occupied territories, which resulted in the death of over 1,000 Israeli settlers and the capture of more than 200 others. This operation was in retaliation for the ongoing crimes committed by the occupation against the Palestinian people, particularly in the besieged Gaza Strip. Following the operation, Israel launched a large-scale military campaign in Gaza aimed at destroying the capabilities of the Palestinian resistance. However, even after a full year, this campaign has failed to achieve its desired outcomes.
Hamas’ heroic attack was just the beginning of a broader conflict that has pushed the region to the brink of chaos. Other actors soon became involved in the conflict, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Ansar Allah movement in Yemen, and several Iran-backed factions in Iraq, all of whom provided support to the Palestinian resistance. The battle has also spread to the West Bank, while Iran launched a limited strike against Israel in April 2024 in response to the assassination of a senior Iranian officer in Syria. In September 2024, Israel began a new military campaign called “Northern Arrows,” targeting Hezbollah in an attempt to weaken its military capabilities, but this operation has so far failed to yield any significant success.
After a year of war, Israel finds itself in a precarious situation. A restrained response to the October 7 operation would have been seen as a sign of weakness by Hamas, encouraging similar attacks in the future. On the other hand, a full-scale military response risked regional escalation and dragging Israel into a prolonged and bloody war, which is precisely what happened. While Israel’s war in Gaza has caused significant damage to the infrastructure of the besieged enclave, major regional actors, including the Arab states that signed the “Abraham Accords,” have refrained from direct involvement and have maintained a position of cautious observation. This reflects the significant shifts in regional relations, as these states seek to protect the gains of their normalization with the Zionist entity.
Despite Israel’s attempts to benefit from normalization, the Palestinian resistance succeeded in undermining these plans. There were expectations that the Abraham Accords could facilitate dialogue between Israel and Saudi Arabia, but the “Swords of Iron” war delayed this dialogue indefinitely, revealing the fragility of these accords in the face of the continuous Palestinian struggle against occupation.
The repercussions of this war also exposed Israel’s failure to find a solution to the conflict. The Hamas operation reshaped the entire landscape, as the Israeli leadership believed that improving the economic conditions in Gaza might push Hamas to abandon its ideological goals. However, the attack demonstrated that returning to the pre-October 7 status quo was no longer possible. Despite Israel’s fierce military response, Hamas remains firmly in control of Gaza, and Israel has yet to develop an effective strategy to end the conflict.
Furthermore, Israel has categorically rejected all international and regional initiatives calling for a political settlement to the Palestinian cause. In July 2024, the Israeli Knesset voted overwhelmingly in favor of a resolution that completely rules out the establishment of a Palestinian state, considering it a threat to Israeli security and a “reward for terrorism,” as they claim. This stance reflects the views of the Israeli public, which overwhelmingly rejects granting Palestinians any political rights and sees war as the only means to ensure its security.
As the war’s first anniversary approaches, Israel finds itself unable to achieve its objectives. While there have been limited military successes, such as the reduction of Hamas’ military capabilities, key objectives like freeing all hostages or completely eliminating the resistance have not been met. Many Palestinian prisoners remain in Hamas’ custody, and any deal to secure their release seems unlikely in the near future. Despite the military strikes on Gaza, Hamas remains in control, and no political or ideological alternative has emerged to replace the movement.
In September 2024, Israel added a new goal to its war efforts, namely the “safe return of northern Israeli residents to their homes,” which led to a larger military campaign against Hezbollah, dubbed “Northern Arrows.” However, the results of this operation remain unclear and cannot yet be evaluated.
Israel faces both external and internal challenges. The events of October 7 further complicated the internal situation in Israel. The political and social crisis that existed before the war has worsened significantly. Initially, the security threat united Israelis behind their government, but over time, internal divisions resurfaced. This war has deepened the rift between the Israeli public and its government, as well as between the military and political leadership.
One of the most pressing issues for Israeli public opinion is the fate of the hostages held by Hamas. Mass protests have erupted since October 2023, calling on the government to strike a deal with Hamas for the release of the prisoners, similar to the deal made in November 2023. While part of Israeli society supports negotiations with Hamas, there is also a significant faction that rejects any form of dialogue and believes that the military option is the only viable solution to Israel’s problems.
In conclusion, after a full year of war, Israel finds itself in a difficult position. The Palestinian resistance has stood firm against the Israeli war machine, demonstrating that the occupation remains incapable of eliminating it or achieving any of its major objectives. The war has also highlighted growing internal pressures in Israel, casting doubt on its ability to maintain internal cohesion.
In general, Israelis do not rate the performance of the ruling coalition and its representatives highly, and the protests are largely a consequence of this factor. The overwhelming majority of Israelis support the creation of a commission to investigate the events of October 7, although they disagree on when exactly it should begin its work: before or after the end of the fighting. The popularity of the ruling Likud remains one-third lower than at the end of 2022, during the last parliamentary elections. However, this is more likely due to the distrust of many Israelis towards the current government (mainly due to its domestic policies) than to disagreement with the general military-political course or the specific objectives of the military operations. Thus, the majority of citizens of the country supported the intensification of the campaign in the north, considering it the most effective way to contain Hezbollah and stop its attacks on Israeli territory.
After a year of war with Gaza, Israel has partially achieved its stated goals: Hamas’ military and administrative capabilities have definitely been significantly reduced, the threat emanating from Gaza has been largely reduced, and a significant number of hostages have been returned. The worst-case scenario, which seemed quite likely from the start, has fortunately not come true: a regional escalation with large-scale involvement of internal and external players has been avoided. At the same time, about a hundred hostages remain in Gaza, and the chances of their release alive are gradually decreasing. The destruction of Hamas’ military capabilities is far from equivalent to the elimination of the ideological threat emanating from the organization, since it is extremely difficult to expect a quick and effective deradicalization of Gaza’s residents given the persistence of all the pressing problems that no one is ready to solve. The prospects for ending military operations on the northern front are still uncertain. The difficult socio-political situation in Israel is not conducive to a way out of the crisis. The country still – as it did a year ago – suffers from internal contradictions and the lack of a plan to resolve them. This is also reflected in the Jewish state’s foreign policy and its approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: at the moment, immediate security challenges overshadow any long-term strategic vision, without which short-term planning is also extremely difficult.
