Since the 1950s, the larger geopolitical context has shaped how the India-China relationship has played out in practice. We have seen it all. There have been phases of détente, indifference, cold war, controlled competition, modus vivendi, peaceful competition and even collaboration.
What we learn from this history is that periods of great uncertainty and major international powershifts have persuaded both countries to stabilise ties, despite their differences and disputes. Two previous phases stand out.
Take, for instance, the early 1950s when the post-second world war system of international relations had yet to settle in Asia. In their own independent ways, we saw both India and China pursue larger roles to cushion the escalating Cold War from undermining Asian security as well as attempting some form of a modus vivendi to keep ties normal.
Another turning point was the end of the Cold War in 1989 and then the onset of unipolarity after 1991. This unprecedented powershift again saw India and China de-escalate their previous border tensions and reach another modus vivendi to normalise ties.
In each instance, both sides benefited from the stabilization whether it was achieving a stable and peaceful periphery, geopolitical security, domestic economic modernization or national and regime stability. Remembering this backdrop is useful, because the present era resembles another one of those moments or turning points in the international landscape. What can we say about the present era?
The first feature is the ongoing rapid transition to multipolarity and a changing balance of power. As this power transition is playing out, several regions such as Europe and the Middle East are witnessing intense political and military conflicts because the previous status quo, that is, the security architecture and equilibrium has been shattered. This is because the US and its allies sought to unilaterally expand their sphere of influence beyond all sustainable limits leading to fierce resistance from other great powers. The ongoing struggle between major powers for a new security framework in those regions is likely to play out over several years.
Ironically, when set against these conflicts and uncertainty, the India China equation looks remarkably calm in contrast, and is one of the main reasons why Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi have chosen to stabilise ties. The two leaders have stabilized ties not only to preempt the expansion of great power conflicts on their overlapping peripheries but also because both sides now have a deeper interest in shaping what the new international landscape will look like in the future.
Both sides have a common interest in building the normative texture of the multipolar order. Will it be inclusive and accommodate many non-western civilizational states like Iran, Russia, China, India and several others?
The present era is historically unprecedented because we are not merely witnessing a material power transition or a change in the balance of power but also a shift from a western civilization-dominated ideological system to a multi-civilizational plural ideologies based international system.
In the realm of ideas on world order, India and China have common ground to exchange their visions and co-create norms that also find a large audience in the Global South, which is where the international community of the future will be located.
The second feature is domestic politics in the US and more broadly in the collective West. The domestic political shifts suggest that the US is not likely to restore its historical role in shaping a new world order. This is not to suggest a US retreat is inevitable or even likely. But rather that US foreign policy under Trump and his successors will focus primarily on national power maximization, control over US political-military alliances, and adopting economic, trade and investment strategies that advance the interests of the domestic US economy and those international supply chains where the US and its allies dominate the innovation and production process.
The proverbial ‘fence’ will be much higher for non-allied states whether it is India, China or most of the Global South. We are staring at the prospect of a US and collective west that will play less of a role in world order and globalization and more acutely focus on the development of material power within the western alliance system.
What does this mean for China and India? To a large extent, both countries were passively relying on the open international order shaped by the US in previous decades to advance their economic interests, particularly in the post-Cold War era. That framework was becoming outdated even a decade ago. The present political shifts within the West has brought forward the time frame by atleast a decade if not more.
The third feature is the crisis in globalization that is impacting not only on the national development interests of India and China but also the roles they play to help steer the geoeconomic landscape in a fresh direction.
The overwhelming demand from the Global South is for an open economic order as well as a more responsive framework and practice of globalization. The neoliberal model of globalization has failed. What most of the developing world including India is now seeking is more relevant and more accessible public goods, public goods and the commons that cannot be weaponized by any single major power, better commercial returns for a country’s natural resources and strategic commodities, more opportunities for industrialization and innovation, fair access to international production supply chains that enable domestic value addition and capacity building including human resource exchanges. The latter is a vital national objective for India who seeks to modernize its industrial-manufacturing base in collaboration with China and other leading economies.
By its essence, a reformed interconnected economic order must emerge via a multilateral process involving many diverse economies with different strengths and competitive advantages. For the moment, BRICS + is certainly the most promising inclusive institutional framework that is engaged in such an order building process. But much more needs to be accomplished if the next chapter of globalization is to be written by and for the Global South.
Unlike the US, China and India cannot afford to retreat or abdicate their responsibility in shaping an inclusive and interconnected multipolar world.
Zorawar Daulet Singh is an award winning author and strategic affairs expert based in New Delhi. He is author, most recently, of ‘Powershift: India China relations in a multipolar world’.
