Cairo: Hani Kamal El Din
With the fall of Damascus and the flight of Bashar al-Assad, the global stage has become a hotbed of discussions. From religious prophecies to the predictions of Nostradamus and Vanga, and analyses from political and scientific perspectives, interpretations are rife. This marks the beginning of a new era filled with uncertainty and questions about the future of Syria and the wider region.
Assessing the Current Situation
A report published by The New York Times on December 11, 2024, titled “Syria After Assad: What Happens Next?” sheds light on the unfolding events. The rebel coalition is reportedly working towards forming a transitional government amidst ongoing conflicts between armed factions and external powers vying to fill the void left by the retreating government forces. Key points include:
- Kurdish fighters in northern Syria, supported by the United States, have agreed to a U.S.-brokered ceasefire in Manbij following clashes with Turkish-backed forces.
- Israeli forces have intensified airstrikes on military positions in Syria, citing concerns over extremist groups gaining control of sensitive sites.
Key Players and Questions
Understanding the evolving landscape in Syria requires addressing several critical questions:
- Who controls the ground reality?
- Who is Ahmad al-Shaar, and what is his role?
- What is Israel’s involvement in the Syrian crisis?
- How is Turkey positioning itself?
- What actions are the United States taking?
- What role do internal factions play in shaping Syria’s future?
Dominant Forces
Leading the charge in the final offensive that toppled Assad’s regime was Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a group that has emerged as the primary power broker in post-Assad Syria. Mohammed al-Bashir, a figure associated with HTS, has assumed the position of interim prime minister until March 1.
Ahmad al-Shaar, formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, emphasized HTS’s commitment to seeking justice for victims of torture and abuses under the previous regime. HTS, once affiliated with al-Qaeda, has since rebranded and is striving for international legitimacy.
Israel’s Role
Israel’s military operations in Syria have escalated dramatically. Reports indicate widespread airstrikes targeting sites previously under regime control. Additionally, Israeli ground forces have breached border areas for the first time in over five decades, signaling a shift in their engagement strategy.
Turkish Maneuvers
The region of Kobani has witnessed fierce battles between Turkish-backed forces and U.S.-supported Kurdish groups. Turkey’s strategic objectives include weakening Kurdish influence, a move that has heightened tensions with Washington.
U.S. Actions
The United States remains focused on dismantling remnants of the Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria. Recent airstrikes targeted ISIS training camps, with President Biden reiterating his administration’s commitment to supporting regional stability during the transitional period.
Internal Factions
Beyond HTS, numerous armed factions continue to operate within Syria. Among them, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) stand out as a significant player. Comprising predominantly Kurdish units and backed by the U.S., the SDF controls vast swathes of northeastern Syria but faces persistent challenges from Turkish forces.
Syrian National Army
This umbrella group of dozens of groups with different beliefs receives funding and weapons from Turkey, which has long been expanding a buffer zone along its border with Syria to protect against Kurdish militants.
Turkey wants to create a territory where it can resettle some of the three million refugees who have fled Syria and are living within its borders. But it has struggled to harmonize the disparate groups that make up the Syrian National Army.
The group is largely made up of the dregs of Syria’s civil war, including many fighters the United States dismissed as criminals and thugs. Some were trained in the United States early in the war, but most were rejected as too extreme or too criminal. Most have no clear ideology and turned to Turkey for salaries of about $100 a month when the group was formed.
Fighters with rifles, dressed in grass mats. Syrian National Army recruits during training in August 2024.
Druze militia
Syria’s Druze minority is concentrated in Suwayda, a region in the southwest. Druze fighters have joined the offensive to topple the Assad regime, launching an offensive in the southwest and clashing with government forces, according to media reports.
Druze fighters are part of a newly formed group of Syrian rebels that includes fighters from other backgrounds, operating under the name “Southern Operations Center.”
The Druze are a religious group that practices an offshoot of Islam that emerged in the 11th century and contains elements of Christianity, Hinduism, Gnosticism, and other philosophies. More than a million Druze live in the Middle East, mostly in Syria and Lebanon, but also in Jordan and Israel.
Islamic State
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, better known as ISIS, seized large swaths of territory in Syria and Iraq in 2014, establishing a brutal caliphate before being recaptured by a U.S.-led coalition. Its members are now largely in hiding.
There have been recent signs of a resurgence of the group in Syria amid broader instability in the region. In July, the Pentagon warned that ISIS attacks in Syria and Iraq could double from the previous year. The group has repeatedly tried to free its members from prison and has maintained a shadow rule in parts of northeastern Syria, the U.S. said.
On October 10, Islamic State forces killed 54 people in the Homs region of central Syria who were members of the Syrian government and fled the fall of the Assad regime, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.
Forecast
Mona Yacoubian (vice president for the Middle East and North Africa at the United States Institute of Peace) writes in The New York Times, “Assad’s Fall Has Changed the Middle East Forever” (12/11/2024):
“The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime not only ends decades of Assad family rule in Syria, it also promises to redistribute power across the Middle East.”
Yacoubian believes that the situation on the ground remains highly uncertain, particularly over whether the rebels will be able to consolidate control and how they will govern if they do.
But as a new reality emerges in Syria, a redistribution of regional power dynamics is already taking shape that dramatically reduces Iran’s influence and allows Turkey to play a decisive role in shaping Syria’s post-Assad future.
At least six foreign armies have fought in Syria’s nearly 14-year civil war, underscoring the underlying geostrategic stakes. Among them, Iran stands out for its unlimited investment in supporting Assad, reportedly spending billions of dollars to prop up the regime and mobilizing tens of thousands of proxy militias. For Tehran, Syria has been the front line of its forward defense strategy, protecting its interests in the region by projecting power and influence. Assad’s fall dramatically undermines that influence, depriving Tehran of a key Arab ally and cutting off its land bridge to its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah. Torn from its long-standing strategic position in Syria, Iran is unlikely to recover from this significant setback anytime soon.
In contrast, Turkey is poised to see its influence expand. Ankara’s ties to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the terrorist group that led the offensive to topple the regime, are complex. Turkey does not openly cooperate with HTS, but maintains quiet lines of communication and influence. The country is likely to become a key interlocutor for HTS and a bridge to the international community, given the group’s outlawed nature, boosting its influence in Syria, where it already maintains a de facto buffer zone across much of the north. It will almost certainly use its new position to keep the Kurdish government in Syria in check and try to begin facilitating the return of some three million Syrian refugees, a source of growing domestic tensions.
The wealthy Gulf monarchies could also benefit. The fall of Assad, who hailed from the Alawite minority, marks the restoration of Sunni power in the heart of the Middle East and could herald Syria as a new Gulf ally. The Gulf states have the opportunity to use their considerable resources to finance Syria’s reconstruction and help shape the country’s trajectory, while reinforcing their vision of regional growth and economic integration. Likewise, Assad’s departure could pave the way for addressing regional security threats posed by destabilizing spillovers from the escalating conflict in Syria, such as drug trafficking, terrorism, and arms smuggling. Fearing jihadist extremism, Gulf states may also seek to moderate the more extreme elements within the HTS group.
For Israel, Syria’s new reality is a mixed blessing. Neutralizing the Iranian and Hezbollah threats in Syria and preventing Iran from easily rearming Hezbollah in the future are important victories for Israel.
But the prospect of a former al-Qaeda affiliate taking power in Damascus is worrisome, to say the least, and Israel will be eager to guard against spillover if Syria faces a period of heightened chaos. Mindful of these potential threats, Israel is already taking steps to bolster its security: it has deployed troops to the demilitarized buffer zone in the Golan Heights and continues to strike strategic targets in Syria, including a security compound and a government research center in Damascus.
For reference:
The Washington Post and CNN (12/11/2024) report that the Israel Defense Forces said on December 11 that warplanes have carried out 500 strikes on Syrian territory since December 8, destroying dozens of missiles, an airfield, weapons production facilities in five cities, and 15 naval vessels, effectively destroying the Syrian navy. The strikes on the Syrian navy also destroyed dozens of sea-to-sea missiles with a range of 50 to 120 miles, the Israeli military said. Fighter jets, drones, tanks, air defense systems,
Israeli officials have characterized the extensive strikes as preemptive in nature, protecting the country from future attacks, rather than a response to an ongoing threat. On December 9, they made a similar rationale in defending the movement of troops outside the UN-controlled buffer zone in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.
“I have approved the air strike on strategic military sites abandoned by the Syrian army to prevent them from falling into the hands of jihadists,” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in a video message on December 10.
Netanyahu said Israel wants relations with the new government in Syria, but he warned rebels against attacking Israel or allowing Iran or its proxies to regain a foothold in the country. “We will respond with force and pay a heavy price,” he said.
“We continue to see Israeli movements and bombing of Syrian territory,” Geir Pedersen, the U.N. special envoy to Syria, said on December 10. “This must stop.” Similar calls have come from governments across the Middle East, from Baghdad to Riyadh.
On December 9, the Saudi Foreign Ministry accused Israel of violating international law and “undermining Syria’s chances to restore its security, stability and territorial integrity.”
The United States, Israel’s main military and diplomatic backer, has characterized its ally’s military activity as “intermittent” in nature and carried out in “extraordinary circumstances.”
“We don’t want anyone … to act in a way that would make it more difficult for the Syrian people to gain legitimate governance,” U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby told reporters on Dec. 10.
Israel has simultaneously claimed responsibility for Assad’s fall — Netanyahu boasted on Dec. 9 that he had “reshaped the Middle East” by weakening Iran and its proxies Hamas and Hezbollah — and expressed concerns about the shape of the new Syrian state.
Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said the military intends to create a “sterile defense zone” in southern Syria and “prevent terrorism from taking hold and organizing.”
As Syria’s military largely melted away in the face of the rebel advance, it vacated military bases believed to hold significant amounts of ammunition and supplies, including the remnants of Assad’s chemical weapons stockpile.
In neighboring Lebanon, the tone of the post-Assad transition will be a defining moment, either delivering a desperately needed victory for Lebanon or plunging the troubled country deeper into crisis. If the transition in Syria goes more or less smoothly, the positive impact on Lebanon could be significant.
Relative calm in Syria would allow the return of more than a million Syrian refugees living in Lebanon, giving the country much-needed space to rebuild and rebuild after a year of conflict with Israel.
Ultimately, as reconstruction in Syria begins, it could even provide jobs and a boost to Lebanon’s crumbling economy.
On the other hand, if rebel groups fail to consolidate control and instead fall back on internal strife, Lebanon could see new refugee flows that could trigger a deeper crisis and even widespread civil violence. Given Syria’s strategic importance, the collapse of the regime has implications for global power dynamics.
According to Yacoubian, while Russia’s post-Assad Syria position remains unclear – in particular, whether it will retain control of its strategically important air and naval bases – the collapse of Russia’s Syrian client has dealt a significant blow to Russian influence in the Middle East. Russian strategists once touted Syria as Russia’s first post-Soviet success, but Assad’s crushing defeat will undoubtedly undermine Russia’s influence in the Middle East and beyond.
For the United States, post-Assad Syria presents both opportunities and challenges. Certainly, the fall of Assad, who was unacceptable to U.S. interests in the region, and the decline of Iranian and Russian influence mark a major victory for the United States. But with a former al-Qaeda affiliate and recognized terrorist group positioning itself as a major force, the United States will face difficult questions about how to engage and safeguard against the worst outcomes. Whether HTS has truly softened as it claims will be critical to determining America’s options. Meanwhile, a potential ISIS resurgence also looms as a significant threat to U.S. national security.
“As the euphoria over Assad’s fall gives way to Syria’s complex reality, the challenges posed by the country’s new political power brokers are only just beginning to emerge. Power vacuums, internal strife, and threats to Syria’s many minorities could spark new chaos and violence. But Syria could also transform its nightmare into an emerging and inclusive state that reflects the diverse mosaic of its religious sects and ethnic groups.”
Joshua Yaffe (State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research) in The National Interest, “What Assad’s Collapse Means for the Middle East” (12/10/2024), writes:
“The sudden collapse of the Syrian regime on Saturday, with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham entering Damascus and Bashar al-Assad fleeing the country, came as no surprise to either Moscow or Tehran. Both had quickly evacuated their personnel, and neither had any interest in coming to the regime’s aid. It wasn’t just that Russia was involved in the fighting in Ukraine and Iran’s proxies were otherwise involved in Israel. Rumors had been swirling in the Gulf and among Syrians abroad since at least September that Russia and Iran were in talks to try to replace Bashar with someone more effective and reliable.”
“Bashar’s reliance on an outdated counterinsurgency strategy inherited from his father has created as many friends as enemies, while steadily thinning the ranks of loyal fighters through attrition and desertion.” “Turkish forces are likely to intervene with a military invasion that will seize more land in the Kurdish-held areas of the semi-autonomous north.
Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE will be eager to prop up some of the many political figures who will soon emerge from exile, desperate to burnish their opposition credentials and become a conduit for foreign capital into an economically struggling country. Many of these Syrians from abroad have long since abandoned the opposition. Some have even collaborated with the Assad regime on economic revival in recent years, but their pasts will be largely forgotten. The real consequences of the changes in Syria, however, will be seen in Jerusalem and Tehran.
Bibi in the Driver’s Seat
Benjamin Netanyahu has accomplished far more than anyone in Israel or the world thought possible on October 8, 2023. Israeli forces destroy Syrian military installations around Mount Hermon to create a buffer zone along Golan Heights, while striking Syria’s chemical weapons sites. It’s time for Netanyahu to translate battlefield victories into political goals, and with like-minded allies soon to take office in Washington, he’s in a position to make demands.
Some of the items on Bibi’s wish list should be easy to understand.
He clearly wants a corridor dividing Gaza north and south, making it easier to monitor and patrol the demilitarized territory.
Similarly, he wants a buffer zone along the border with Lebanon, with Israel free to enforce it as it sees fit.
He wants concrete assurances from a wide range of international partners that they will take concerted and decisive action against Iran’s nuclear program. But that may be a step too far. Indeed, he may expect greater willingness from many countries around the world to engage in a renewed campaign of maximum pressure.
He wants to rehabilitate his international image. That could mean a visit to the White House shortly after Inauguration Day, or a photo op with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. If the stars align, it’s possible he could even get both.
A number of Israeli far-right politicians, notably Finance Minister Smotrich, have called on the incoming Trump administration to support Israel’s efforts to “apply Israeli sovereignty” to the settlements. This is not to be confused with outright annexation of the West Bank. Annexation has troubled previous Israeli political and military leaders because of its impact on demographics. However, it is a step beyond the current level of Israeli control over Area C, which would eliminate the administrative body run by the Defense Ministry known as COGAT (Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories) and normalize governance under civilian control. The settler movement will see this as legal and moral justification for expanding settlements without fear of arrest or sanctions.
The question is whether Netanyahu wants this increased control over the settlements, or whether he simply wants to keep the hope alive in order to preserve his fragile coalition, using it as a bargaining chip to extract concessions from international partners.
Washington must recognize that Bibi is now looking beyond mere political survival to his legacy. He sees no viable future for Palestinian statehood. A permanent legal status for the settlements may be what he sees as his long-term contribution to Israel’s growth and security.”
Khamenei’s Tenuous Foothold
“The past year of fighting in the Middle East has repeatedly ended in public humiliation for Iran and serious setbacks for its proxies in the region. Iranian sources have told Reuters that they are in touch with members of the Syrian opposition now in control of Damascus, and that the Iranian government has collaborated with other Sunni extremist organizations in the past. But it is hard to imagine Iran regaining anything remotely resembling the level of access and control it enjoyed under Assad.
The inescapable conclusion is that the leadership in Tehran was unprepared for such a development, had no alternative strategy or contingency plan, and failed to respond with even the most basic public relations campaign – as it did with Israel’s assassination of Hezbollah’s top leadership and Israel’s effective response to two rounds of Iranian airstrikes. Fingers will inevitably be pointed, not only among Iran’s proxies but also among key decision-makers in Tehran.
Mid-level officers in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who had previously enjoyed two decades of success in expanding their influence in the region, have now seen many of those gains reversed or curtailed. It is not hard to imagine them looking warily at their political leadership, worried about their reputations and concerned that an older generation of clerics who have held power for too long will leave them a weak and dysfunctional state. In this regard, the real danger is not that Iran will lash out with another ill-conceived and ineffective attack in the region, but rather a soft coup in Tehran that replaces one hardline regime with an even harder one.
Syria’s political and military landscape remains shrouded in uncertainty as both local and international actors vie for influence. In this volatile environment, the trajectory of Syria’s future is open to a myriad of possibilities, with every stakeholder playing a pivotal role in shaping the region’s destiny.
